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Abstract—Information security awareness (ISA) is a practice
focused on the set of skills, which help a user successfully mitigate
a social engineering attack. Previous studies have presented vari-
ous methods for evaluating the ISA of both PC and mobile users.
These methods rely primarily on subjective data sources such
as interviews, surveys, and questionnaires that are influenced
by human interpretation and sincerity. Furthermore, previous
methods for evaluating ISA did not address the differences
between classes of social engineering attacks. In this paper, we
present a novel framework designed for evaluating the ISA of
smartphone users to specific social engineering attack classes.
In addition to questionnaires, the proposed framework utilizes
objective data sources: a mobile agent and a network traffic
monitor; both of which are used to analyze the actual behavior of
users. We empirically evaluated the ISA scores assessed from the
three data sources (namely, the questionnaires, mobile agent, and
network traffic monitor) by conducting a long-term user study
involving 162 smartphone users. All participants were exposed
to four different security challenges that resemble real-life social
engineering attacks. These challenges were used to assess the
ability of the proposed framework to derive a relevant ISA
score. The results of our experiment show that: (1) the self-
reported behavior of the users differs significantly from their
actual behavior; and (2) ISA scores derived from data collected
by the mobile agent or the network traffic monitor are highly
correlated with the users’ success in mitigating social engineering
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social engineering (SE) is the process of exploiting human
vulnerabilities in order to penetrate to a computerized system.
This is usually accomplished by manipulating a user to per-
form actions such as installing software, granting privileges, or
revealing confidential information. According to the Internet
Security Threat Report (ISTR) published by Symantec in 2018
[52], the chance that SE methods will be selected as an attack
vector is greater than any other advanced technical exploit.
Hence, SE attacks pose a significant security threat to society.
Social engineering attacks are not limited to PC users. In
fact, in the past five years the number of SE attacks targeting
mobile devices users is rapidly increasing [52]. According to
Avast and Mcafee mobile threat reports (2019) the majority of
attacks on mobile devices exploit human factor vulnerabilities
(such as downloading applications from unknown sources,
clicking on suspicious links, granting unnecessary permission).
Furthermore, according to Checkpoint’s security report, every
organization had suffered a mobile malware attack during
2018.1 When SE is the most popular way for spreading
malware in mobile platforms [52], SE attacks targeting mo-
bile users become a major concern to both individuals and
organizations.
Information security awareness (ISA) is a practice focused
on the set of skills which help a user to successfully mitigate
SE attacks. Since most SE threats are not covered by techno-
logical countermeasures, ISA is the most effective method to
prevent SE attacks. Thus, assessing the ISA level of employees
and thereby identifying those who are more vulnerable to
SE attacks is extremely important for organizations. Early
identification of such employees can be used to improve the
security level of the organization, for example, by updating
their security policies [49] and implementing personalized
security awareness programs [12], [33], [53].
Previous studies have presented various methods for eval-
uating and increasing the ISA of PC users [53], [33], [12],
[37], [36], [49]. However, the challenges in evaluating the
security awareness of smartphone users are different from PC
users for several reasons. First, smartphones are equipped with
unique/different functionalities that are less common in PCs
(location services, motion sensors, SMS, application stores and
etc.) Second, smartphone users consume content and services
mostly via apps, opposed to browsers in PCs. Third, some
security safeguards are less common on smartphones than on
PCs (e.g., antivirus or IDS), while others are implemented and
used differently (permissions, certificates handling, encryption
storage, authentication mechanism). Finally, the threats are
different. According to the Internet security threat report
(ISTR) [52], the top threat categories for smartphone users
are fake apps, spyware, SMS messages, and permission abuse;
in contrast PC users top threats are spear phishing, malicious
websites, Trojans, and web-server exploits. These main differ-
ences clearly indicate that different security awareness skills
are required by a mobile user for operating safely mobile
devices, compared to a PC.
Most current studies on ISA assessment depend excessively
on the subjects’ response to questionnaires [42] or surveys [8].
These methods rely on the subjects’ self-reported behavior,
and thus, tend to be subjective and biased [50]. Moreover,
these methods require the subjects’ active involvement and
1https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/product-related/report/2018-
security-report.pdf
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collaboration, thereby consuming significant human resources.
Other methods are based on measuring the momentary
behavior of subjects during specific events (e.g., by monitoring
their reaction while facing a simulated SE attacks) [4], [31],
[39], [23]. These methods, however, tend to be sensitive to
environmental/contextual factors and therefore cannot provide
a reliable ISA score [15]. For these reasons, previous studies
have argued that in order to reliably assess the ISA, continuous
measurement of the subjects’ actual behavior must be con-
sidered [36], [37], [50]. Although such measurements were
developed for the PC [24], [56], the criteria for a security
aware smartphone user are different from those of a PC
user [13]. To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive ISA
assessment method, which encompasses the various aspects of
mobile security and is based on continuous measurement of
users’ actual behavior has not yet been developed for mobile
platforms.
In this paper, we suggest a novel framework for assessing
the ISA of smartphone users. The framework utilizes data
collected and analyzed from three different data sources to
derive/measure a set of criteria for a security aware smartphone
user: (1) a mobile device agent, which is installed on the
subjects’ devices and measures the subjects’ actual behav-
ior (e.g., applications installed, security settings, connectivity
management, and browsing history), (2) a network traffic
monitor, which analyzes the network traffic sent to/from the
subject’s devices, and (3) a security questionnaire, specifically
designed to assess the self-reported behavior of smartphone
users.
The expert-based process suggested in [13] is utilized for
deriving an ISA model that is specific to an SE attack class.
We define a SE attack class as the set of SE attacks that ex-
ploit similar human vulnerabilities (e.g., phishing, application-
related, and MITM attacks). Each model defines the contribu-
tion (i.e., weight) of each criterion to the overall ISA score of
a specific SE attack class and can be applied for deriving the
ISA score from the measured criteria. The ISA score provides
an indication of the ability of the user to mitigate a particular
class of SE attack.
In order to evaluate the proposed framework we conducted
an empirical experiment involving 162 smartphone users for a
duration of seven to eight weeks each. In addition to the data
collected from the three data sources mentioned above, the
participants were exposed to four different security challenges
that resemble real-life SE attack scenarios: a phishing attack,
an eavesdropping attack, a certificate manipulation attack, and
a privilege escalation attack.
To validate the proposed framework, we tested the corre-
lations between the derived ISA scores and the results of
the challenges. We also analyzed the correlation between
ISA scores derived by the different data sources. In addi-
tion, we systematically compared the data extracted by the
mobile agent, network traffic monitor and challenges with
the questionnaire results in order to examine the bias in the
questionnaires compared to objective measurements within the
context of information security.
The results of the experiment show that measurements of the
subjects’ actual behavior using the mobile agent/network traf-
fic monitor produce ISA scores that correlate with the subjects’
success or failure in the challenges. Our findings also question
the reliability of assessing the ISA of smartphone users based
on their self-reported behavior. In our experiment, subjects
who reported to behave cautiously with respect to smartphone
security failed in multiple social engineering challenges, while
subjects who acknowledged their unsafe behavior successfully
mitigated most of the challenges.
Moreover, we show that the ISA scores derived from the
mobile agent are highly correlated with the ISA scores derived
from the network traffic monitor. In contrast, the ISA scores
derived from the questionnaire data source were found to have
a very little correlation with the scores derived from the mobile
agent and network traffic monitor data sources.
In summary, the contribution of the proposed research are
two fold:
• A framework for evaluating the ISA of smartphone
users. The first contribution of this research is a frame-
work that can automatically detect users who are more
vulnerable to social engineering attacks. The proposed
framework relies on actual user behavior as observed
from multiple data sources, as opposed to commonly
used subjective self-reported behavior methods which
were found to be unreliable in some cases. Moreover,
in contrast to previous works, which explore the ISA of
smartphone users with respect to a specific information
security aspect (e.g., permissions, lock screen, etc.), the
proposed method integrates multiple mobile security as-
pects into a single ISA score per attack class.
• A comprehensive user study. The second contribution
of this research is a comprehensive and very unique user
study. Within this study we monitored, using four dif-
ferent information sources (questionnaire, mobile agent,
network traffic and challenges), the behaviour of 162
users while using their own smartphones, as opposed to
previous works that either measure the momentary behav-
ior of the subjects during specific events, or performed the
assessment in a controlled environment, by using some
dedicated device/platform. This unique user study allow
us to explore the bias in questionnaires compared to ob-
jective measurements with respect to multiple behaviours
within the context of information security.
II. BACKGROUND
Kruger and Kearney developed a prototype for assessing
the ISA in organizations [37]. The authors suggest that stake-
holders define focus areas, i.e., primary technological issues
related to the organization’s information security, and explore
them within the context of three psychological dimensions:
knowledge, attitude, and behavior. Each dimension addresses
a specific psychological aspect of the focus area and contains
factors that assist in the quantitative measurement of the
dimension.
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Bitton et al. [13] redefined and adjusted the prototype
presented by Kruger and Kearney for the mobile platform. The
authors presented an extensive list of measurable indicators,
also referred to as criteria, for a security aware smartphone
user. In addition, the authors introduced the concept of deriv-
ing the ISA level of a user with respect to a given class of SE
attacks i.e., attacks that exploit similar human vulnerabilities.
The motivation behind this concept is that the skills required
to mitigate one class of attacks may differ from the skills
required to mitigate another class of attacks.
To assess the ISA of users for a specific class of attacks,
Bitton et al. suggested the expert-based process presented in
Figure 1 (in blue). As can be seen, the inputs to this process
are: (1) an attack class (denoted by a), and (2) a list of
criteria for a security aware smartphone user (listed in the ISA
taxonomy [13]). Security experts utilize the analytic hierarchy
process (AHP) [51] to efficiently estimate the contribution of
each criterion to the ability of users to mitigate SE attacks of
particular classes. The outcome of this process is a security
awareness model, which is a set of weights w(i)(a) that reflect
the contribution of each criterion i to the ability of users to
mitigate attack class a.
With the assistance of 17 security experts from both
academia and industry, Bitton et al. applied the process and de-
rived security awareness models three attack classes: Man-in-
the-middle attacks such as session/signal hijacking, SSL strip,
eavesdropping, and rogue access point; Application related
attacks such as application phishing, malicious notifications
(e.g., error messages), in app pop-ups, malicious advertise-
ments, clicking fraud, Trojan applications, and rootkits; and
Phishing attacks such as social network fraud (e.g., fake links,
friend/game requests), phishing emails, websites, URL, SMS,
IRC, forums.
In this paper we extend the work presented in [13] by
introducing a comprehensive framework for measuring the
criteria for a security aware smartphone user and computing
the ISA score of smartphone users to different classes of
SE attacks. The process of computing the ISA score of a
smartphone user (denoted as u) for a specific class of SE
attack (denoted as a) is presented in Figure 1 (in red). As
can be seen, there are two inputs to the computation process:
(1) the security awareness model for the particular class of
attacks as defined by Bitton et al. , and (2) an estimation of
all criteria for a particular user (i.e., the set of measured values
for each criterion i for user u), as measured by the proposed
framework.
III. RELATED WORK
The domain of ISA has been researched extensively in
the past. In this section, we describe previously suggested
methods for assessing the ISA of mobile users. Specifically,
we present related work that used questionnaires as the data
source (Section III-A), research that used software agents as a
passive measurement data source (Section III-B), and related
work that applied active challenges, either for evaluating a
proposed method of ISA measurement or as a tool for training
Figure 1: The process of computing the security awareness
score of a user for an attack class
users (Section III-C). In addition, we summarized all relevant
papers in the domain of ISA assessment in Table I.
A. The Assessment of ISA Using Questionnaires
PC users. A popular method for assessing the ISA of
PC users is the Human Aspects of Information Security
Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) [47], which aims to measure the
knowledge, attitude, and self-reported behavior of employees
regarding information security. The external validity of HAIS-
Q was examined in previous studies, by using the test-retest
method [42] and conducting phishing tests [46]. Onarlioglu
et al. studied the resilience of PC users to phishing attacks
by asking participants to rank the potential risk resulting from
certain scenarios [45].
While Parsons et al. [46], [45] focused on the PC domain
and conducted an evaluation involving one attack vector (i.e.,
phishing tests), in this study we focus on smartphone users
and evaluate the proposed method on multiple SE attacks.
In addition, the evaluation presented in these works was
performed in a controlled environment (by asking subjects to
assess the safety of clicking links in a series of simulated
phishing emails), which may not reflect the subjects’ behavior
in a real attack scenario [14]. In this study, the various attack
simulations are executed in the natural environment of the
users, which totally reflects the subject’s behaviour in a real
attack scenario. Furthermore, in contrast to the proposed re-
search these studies do not validates the self reported behavior
of the users using objective data sources (e.g., an agent which
installed in the user’s PC and measure the actual behaviour of
the user)
Mobile users. Androulidakis and Kandus studied the se-
curity awareness of smartphone users through questionnaires
[10], [11], [9]. Based on their questionnaires, Esmaeli [20]
suggested a model for assessing factors that affected infor-
mation security behavior in smartphone networks. Mylonas
et al. studied the ISA of smartphone users in the context of
downloading applications from official application repositories
(e.g., Google Play, and Apple’s App Store) [43]. Gkioulos et
al. presented an analysis of a security questionnaire, designed
specifically for assessing the ISA of smartphone users [27],
[26]. Their results indicate that for several security topics, the
security competence level of users does not affect the subjects
self-reported behavior. Each of these works contributed sig-
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[42],[47],[46] PC, Mobile No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Questionnaire Controlled Environment
[10],[11], [9] Mobile Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Questionnaire No
[20] Mobile Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes Questionnaire No
[43] Mobile Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes Questionnaire No
[27],[26] Mobile Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Questionnaire No
[18],[19] PC, Mobile No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Questionnaire, passivemeasurements No
[45] PC No No Yes No Yes No No No No Laboratory tests No
[56] PC No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Survey, PC agent No
[25],[24] PC Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No Interviews, PC agent No
[23] PC No No No No Yes No No No No Surveys, and interviews Yes
[54] Mobile No No No No No No No No No Mobile agent No
The proposed
framework Mobile Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Questionnaire
Mobile agent
Network traffic analysis
Yes
Table I: Summary of existing methods for assessing the ISA of users: as can be noticed, previous works are mainly rely on
subjective data sources, are not validated using attack scenarios in an uncontrolled environment (with the exception of [23],
which used a single phishing experiment), and are not encompass all relevant focus areas (in most cases only small set of
security topics were considered in each focus area.)
nificantly to the design of the security questionnaire proposed
in this study.
Nevertheless, previous works have three main limitations.
First, prior works explore the ISA of smartphone users with
respect to specific information security aspect. As summarized
on Table I many important aspects of smartphone security
awareness (such application usage, browsing, and account
security) are not covered by these works. In addition, the
integration of different information security aspects into a
single comprehensive and complete framework for assessing
the ISA of users was not presented in prior works. Second,
these works do not validates the self reported behaviour of
users using objective data sources (such as a mobile agent
and network traffic monitoring). In this work, we address this
gap by developing three orthogonal methods for assessing
the ISA of users, a security questionnaire, mobile agent and
network traffic monitor. We also compared the results of the
three assessment methods and provides meaningful insights
with regards to their reliability and accuracy. Third, previous
studies was mostly evaluated using very limited set of attack
vectors (typically different levels of phishing emails), which in
most cases was performed in a controlled environment (which
may not reflect the subjects’ behavior in a real attack scenario).
In this study we evaluate the framework by measuring his/her
reaction when facing multiple real-life attack scenarios.
B. The Assessment of ISA Using Passive Measurements
PC users. Forget et al. introduced the Security Behavior
Observatory (SBO), a client-server architecture designed for
long-term monitoring of client machines running the Windows
operating system [24]. In follow-up research they utilized the
SBO to validate the self-reported behavior of users, assessed
through interviews [25]. Wash et al. also presented a data
collection system to validate the self-reported behavior of PC
users, assessed through surveys [56].
Redmiles et al. compared real measurement data to survey
results with respect to a specific user behavior: software
updating [50]. Their results indicate that for software updating
the self-reported data varies consistently and systematically
with measured data.
Although these studies included objective measurements
and continuous monitoring of the subjects’ actual behavior,
they focused on very specific user behaviors. In addition,
they centered on PCs rather than smartphones. Hence, these
studies did not cover technological aspect that are relevant
for smartphone ISA, such as location-based services, motion
sensors, microphones, permissions and etc. Furthermore, these
studies was never evaluated using real-life attack scenarios.
Nonetheless, their practical results support the findings pre-
sented in this paper, namely the reports of users regarding
their behavior are unreliable.
Mobile users. The self-reported behavior of users tend to
be biased [7], [38]. Consequently, ISA assessment based on
users’ self-reported behavior tends to be inaccurate. Because of
this, researchers have developed objective measurement tools
for measuring the actual behavior of users. Egelman et al.
developed and examined the validity of SeBIS [19], a security
questionnaire intended to measure the attitude of users towards
security-related topics [18]. In their study, Egelman et al.
examined the validity of their questionnaire using three distinct
experiments: (1) by requesting the subjects to suggest a strong
password and identify phishing URLs, (2) by examining the
operating system version of the subjects personal computer
two weeks after a release of an update, and (3) by checking for
the existence of a secure lock screen on the subject’s personal
smartphone.
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The authors of [54] also studied the ISA of smartphone
users in the context of lock screen security (e.g., pattern,
textual password). In their experiment, the authors provided
smartphones to the subjects with unlimited data, SMS, and
mobile-to-mobile use in exchange for being monitored while
participating in the study. During the course of the experiment,
the subjects also completed several surveys to assess the
factors that influenced the subjects’ decision to use a lock
screen code or share this code with acquaintances.
Wijesekera et al. studied the perception of smartphone users
regarding permission [57]. In their experiment, the authors
collected contextual information about the state of the device
when permissions are requested. At the end of the experiment,
in a concluding survey, they asked the subjects about the
permissions granted and denied as well as their decision
making in accordance to specific contexts.
These works have four main limitations. First, the above
methods explore the ISA of smartphone users with respect to
specific information security aspect. For instance, Egelman et
al. [18] focused solely on password usage, OS version and
lock screen; Van et al. [54] was also focused solely on lock
screen security; and Wijesekera et al. [57] focused solely
on application permissions. As summarized in Table I, many
important aspects of smartphone security awareness was not
covered by these works. In addition, the integration of different
information security aspects into a single comprehensive and
complete framework for assessing the ISA of users was not
presented in prior works.
In this work, we address this gap by presenting a com-
prehensive and complete framework for assessing the ISA of
smartphone users. Within this framework, we develop multiple
sensors that collects device’s security attributes and monitor
the behaviour of the user, with respect to multiple information
security aspect (the complete list of sensors is summarized in
Table II in Appendix ??). In addition, based on an expert-based
procedure, we integrate the various mobile security aspects
into a single ISA score per attack class.
Second, previous studies are either measuring the behavior
of the subjects within a specific context (e.g., updating a spe-
cific program) and in a controlled environment [19], or provide
additional smartphone to the participant for the experiment
period. Thus, may not reflect the actual behaviour of the user
when using his own smartphone on his natural environment.
Third, previous studies were not evaluated using real-life
social engineering attacks. Hence, it is hard to estimate their
impact to the information security of an organization in a
real-life deployment. In this study we evaluate the framework
by measuring his/her reaction when facing multiple real-life
attack scenarios.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the assessment of
user’s ISA through network traffic was never presented in
prior research. The contribution of this kind of assessment
is numerous, since it provides a completely passive method
for assessing user’s ISA (i.e., without any interaction with the
subject or subject’s device).
C. The Assessment of ISA Using Attack Scenarios
Previous studies have developed methodologies for design-
ing experiments that include security challenges. Dodge et
al. [17] outlined the aspects to consider when designing
a phishing experiment in which the efficacy of a security
awareness program is evaluated. The authors of [30] utilized
publicly available information on social networks to automati-
cally execute spear phishing challenges. Their results show that
the ability of subjects to mitigate phishing attacks decreases
dramatically when the origin of the message is one of the
subjects’ acquaintances.
Security challenges (i.e., security exercises) have also been
used as a method for assessing the ISA of users. The authors
of [23] utilized surveys, interviews, and phishing challenges
to explore the factors that affect the ability of subjects to
mitigate phishing attacks, as well as the correlation between
self-reported and observed behavior. Although their study was
not targeted at the mobile domain, their results support our
conclusion that the self-reported behavior of subjects does not
necessarily reflect their behavior when faced with a real attack
scenario [14].
Kumaraguru et al. introduced PhishGuru, an embedded
training system that teaches subjects how to mitigate phishing
attacks [40]. In subsequent research, the authors performed a
real-world evaluation of PhishGuru with 515 subjects for a
period of 28 days. The results of their evaluation show that
PhishGuru is effective [39]. The author of [31], implemented
a phishing experiment based on the methodology presented
in [17]. Their results show that phishing exercises can improve
the subjects’ ISA with regard to phishing.
While SE challenges have been used in the past for assess-
ing the ISA of users, the vast majority of them were focused
solely on phishing attacks, and were not targeted at the mobile
platform. In this study we implement four different challenges
(Namely, phishing challenge, SPAM, Permission abuse and
certificate manipulation).
IV. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework encompasses three types of data
sources: a mobile device agent, which is installed on the
subjects’ smartphones and measures their actual behavior; a
network traffic monitor which extracts a set of behavioral
properties from the network traffic transmitted to/from the
subjects’ smartphones; and a security questionnaire designed
to measure the ISA of smartphone users. Each data source
can be used separately to assess the ISA of a user; thus, the
assessment process will result in three ISA scores for each
user and attack class.
A. Mobile Device Agent
The first data source is implemented as a software applica-
tion (agent) installed on the subjects’ smartphones.
Using a variety of dedicated software modules (i.e., sen-
sors), the agent continuously monitors the actual behavior
of the subjects while operating their smartphone. Thus, it
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provides a complete, objective, and continuous record of the
subjects’ actual behavior.
These dedicated sensors are used to estimate the ISA criteria
presented in [13], which can later be used for assessing the
ISA of a given subject for a specific class of SE attacks. The
complete list of ISA criteria, as well as their indicators from
the mobile agent is presented in Appendix VII-B.
The sensors implemented can be categorized into four
groups: connectivity, applications, content, and device. The
complete list of sensors is summarized in Table II.
1) Connectivity: The connectivity of a device can pose
a threat to the user. For instance, the Bluetooth protocol
has already been used many times as an attack vector [29],
[9], [48], [41]. Similarly, untrusted Wi-Fi networks are fertile
ground for network attacks such as eavesdropping and man-
in-the-middle (MITM) [41].
Within the proposed framework, we developed software
modules, which are used to monitor the behavior of the user
while operating the device’s connectivity sensors (e.g., Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, GPS, and NFC), and collect statistical information
regarding the incoming/outgoing network traffic of each ap-
plication.
Specifically, we utilize the data extracted from these sensors
to evaluate various criteria related to communication channels.
For instance, to identify a potential risk of eavesdropping
and content hijacking, we explore connections to unencrypted
Wi-Fi networks to detect files and private data transmitted
as plain-text over these insecure channels (N1, N2, N4 in
Appendix VII-B). We also examine whether the user has
privacy concerns with respect to connectivity, by observing
whether the user manages the connectivity sensors cautiously,
i.e., disables a connectivity when it is not in use (PC1 in
Appendix VII-B).
2) Applications: The applications installed on the smart-
phone have the ability to access the user’s sensitive data, as
well as to collect sensors’ data in real-time (e.g., camera,
microphone, GPS, etc.); thus, malicious applications can pose
a threat to the user.
The application sensors are used for collecting indicators
of careless user behavior, with respect to installation and
management of applications. As applications from dubious
sources are more likely to be malicious [43], [22], [32], the
source of the application is a very important indicator for the
ISA of a user with respect to applications. For this reason, we
search for such installation and use third party services (such
as VirusTotal [5]) to identify malicious applications (AI1 in
Appendix VII-B). We also search for applications that require
root permission, since careless user behavior with rooted
devices may permit applications to bypass the application’s
sandbox mechanism [48], [16] (AI4 in Appendix VII-B).
Since the permission mechanism can be easily exploited
through SE [55], [35], [44], [28], we examine the permissions
requested by applications with a low rating or low number of
downloads in order to identify sensitive permissions granted
to suspicious applications (AI2,AI3 in Appendix VII-B).
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Figure 2: A distribution of the installation times of system
and user applications for a specific sampled smartphone user.
The applications installed on a subject’s device can also
indicate reckless behavior. Thus, we check for the existence
of anti-virus software, as well as password management,
backup and VPN services, since their existence corresponds to
cautious user behavior (SS2, N3, and A3 in Appendix VII-B).
Moreover, we continuously monitor updates and deletions
of applications to validate that the user manages his/her
applications carefully (AH1, AH3 in Appendix VII-B).
A challenging task with regard to the data mining of the
application sensors was identifying the specific applications
installed by the subjects themselves. As different vendors
include different system applications on their devices, these
applications, which typically require many sensitive and dan-
gerous permissions, are mixed in with the users’ applications.
Nonetheless, we noticed that system applications are usually
installed in a burst that precedes the installation of applications
by a user, sometimes many months before the first user-
installed application. In contrast, user applications are installed
gradually along a long period of time. Figure 2 presents a
sample distribution of installation times for both user and
system applications for a sampled smartphone user. We can
clearly see the burst of system application installations that
precedes the installations of the first user applications.
In addition, it can also be noticed that user applications are
installed over a period of nine months (with a slight increase
in the number of user applications installed at the beginning
of this period).
For this reason, in order to filter out the system applications,
we first sort the subjects’ application lists by the application’s
installation time; then, we eliminate large installation bursts
that appeared early in the installation timeline.
3) Content: Smartphones have changed the way we con-
sume data and communicate with each other [34]. In 2018,
52.2% of all website traffic was generated by mobile phones.2
Furthermore, 55% of all the emails opened, were opened
through mobile devices,3 thus exposing smartphone users
to additional threats such as spam, phishing, and account
hijacking.
The content sensors monitor statistical information regard-
ing the browsing history, email messages, and SMS messages.
Specifically, we use the browsing data to identify malicious
domains, e.g., by using VirusTotal [5]); and to detect expired
and self-signed SSL certificates, e.g., by using OpenSSL [3]
2https://www.statista.com/statistics/241462/global-mobile-phone-website-
traffic-share/
3https://returnpath.com/downloads/email-client-experience/
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Group Sensor Sampling Method Description
Connectivity
Wi-Fi When Wi-Fi changed Records the connected Wi-Fi access point (SSID, BSSID) and its security capabilities
Bluetooth When Bluetoothchanged Detects connected Bluetooth devices
Traffic Every 30 minutes Collects statistic information about the volume of ingoing/outgoing network traffic of
each package and process in the mobile device
Application
Installed apps Every month (1) Samples the installed applications and their permissions, and (2) scans the installed
packages in VirusTotal and issues a notification when a package is updated or removed
Running apps Every 30 minutes Samples the running applications and processes
Application changes When applicationchanges Monitors application updates, application deletions, and application installations.
Content
Browser search Every 30 minutes Monitors the browser searches and URL’s, scans the URL’s in VirusTotal and Web Of
Trust
Emails Every four hours Provides statistics about the mailboxes (email sent, email received, spam received, etc.)
SMS Upon receiving SMS Monitors links sent in SMSs.
Device
Hardware Every week Collects model and brand information
Software Every week Collects information about the OS, build number, and firmware
Root checker Every week Checks whether the device is rooted
Screen lock Every week Checks the screen lock type (PIN, pattern, none, etc.)
Table II: The sensors implemented within the mobile agent, classified to four groups.
(B1, B5 in Appendix VII-B). We utilize the default email API,
as well as the Gmail API [2] to analyze the spam mailbox and
detect the opening of spam emails (VC1 in Appendix VII-B).
We monitor malicious links sent via SMS messages (VC1
in Appendix VII-B); by crosschecking the SMS information
with the browsing history, we identify connections made to
malicious domains that were initiated using SMS messages
(VC2 in Appendix VII-B). In addition, we identify the use
of two-factor authentication services by searching for SMS
messages with security codes (A2 in Appendix VII-B).
4) Device: The device’s state and settings are very impor-
tant aspects of smartphone security awareness. One of the
most popular attack vectors in smartphones is the exploitation
of known vulnerabilities. Thus, maintaining an up to date
operating system is an extremely important countermeasures
against cyber attacks on smartphones.
Within the framework, we develop sensors that collects
the device’s security attributes. For instance, we examine
whether the device’s operating system is up to date (OS1 in
Appendix VII-B). We explore whether the user protects his/her
data from unwanted physical access, by validating lock screen,
PIN code and pattern use (SS5 in Appendix VII-B). We also
test whether the device is rooted (OS2 in Appendix VII-B).
B. Network Traffic Monitor
The second data source is a network traffic monitor, which
extracts a set of behavioral attributes from the Internet traffic
of the subjects. These attributes are later used to evaluate the
ISA criteria that serve as the input of the process of assessing
a subject’s ISA for a specific SE attack class.
The primary advantage of this data source is rooted in its
passiveness. In contrast to questionnaires and mobile agents,
which require some level of collaboration and interaction with
the subject, network traffic monitoring is passive, taking place
with no user interaction or involvement whatsoever.
The processes for extracting the behavioral attributes using
a network traffic monitor can be divided into four categories:
domain, application level protocols, deep packet inspection
(DPI), and contextual analysis.
1) Domain: The domains exchanged within application
layer protocols, such as the HTTP host and SSL server
name, can provide indications regarding the users behavior.
For instance, recurrent TCP sessions to anti-virus domain can
indicate that the user has an anti-virus application.
In order to identify indicators of cautious/reckless behavior
we extract the domains from the raw network traffic of users.
Using third party services (such as Web of Trust (WoT) [6],
VirusTotal [5], BitDefender, Dr. Web, and Websense Threat-
Seeker), we classify the domains into two types of categories:
(1) categories that are related to information security (e.g.,
scam, spam, ads/pop-ups, malware or viruses, privacy risks,
etc.); and (2) categories that are related to the content of the
session (e.g., social network, email, news, forum, etc.) This
classification allows us to identify reckless behavior such as
connecting to malicious sites (B1 in Appendix VII-B).
The domain’s data was also used to identify the
communication with common analytic services (such as
ad.doubleclick.net), which provide indications about pop-up
and advertisement clicks (AH2 in Appendix VII-B). In ad-
dition, we identify recurrent connections to domains that are
associated with security applications (e.g., anti-virus, password
management services, etc.) to detect the presence of security
countermeasures (A3, SS2, SS3 in Appendix VII-B).
2) Application level protocols: In this category we fo-
cus on two common application level protocols: HTTP and
TLS. HTTP is an application level protocol widely used for
hypertext information systems (e.g., Web applications). The
header of an HTTP packet includes general information about
the smartphone. Specifically, the user-agent field specifies
the device model and OS version. We use this information
to understand whether the user is constantly updates his/her
device’s operating system(OS1 in Appendix VII-B).
TLS (and its predecessor, SSL) is an application layer
protocol used to provide secured communication over un-
trusted networks. TLS provides server authenticity using dig-
7
ital certificates which are transmitted from the server to the
client during the handshake. TLS security is rooted in users’
trust of the certificate authorities that issue these certificates.
Accepting an untrusted certificate (e.g., self-signed, expired,
invalid signature, etc.) is considered risky behavior, since it
exposes the user to various attack vectors, such as phishing
and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. To identify this type
of behavior, we monitor sessions that (a) included untrusted
certificates, and (b) were not terminated immediately after the
handshake with the RST flag. Such sessions strongly indicate
that the user has accepted the untrusted certificate (B5 in
Appendix VII-B).
3) Deep packet inspection: Transmitting private informa-
tion via an unencrypted protocol can expose the user to
eavesdropping. Thus, the existence of private content within
the unencrypted network traffic of a user can be extremely
indicative of the user’s ISA. Deep packet inspection is a
type of data processing which provides in depth inspection of
the content of network traffic in order to extract meaningful
patterns or insights. This includes protocol headers, data
structures, as well as the payload of messages (i.e., layers 2
to 7 of the OSI model).
In order to determine the user’s likelihood of being the
target of eavesdropping, we implement a dedicated DPI pro-
cess. Specifically, we reconstruct the TCP session, decode
GZIP/XML/JSON encoded traffic, and extract the content in a
readable format. This content is then analyzed to identify per-
sonal information such as email addresses, passwords, credit
card numbers, GPS coordinates, etc. (B3 in Appendix VII-B).
We also identify file downloads and use third party services
(such as VirusTotal [5]) to detect malicious files (B2 in
Appendix VII-B). Furthermore, focusing on the downloads of
Android application packages (APK), we identify installations
of applications from dubious sources (AI1 in Appendix VII-B).
4) Contextual analysis: The security awareness of subjects
is also affected by the context of use. Therefore, some ISA
criteria reflect the behavior of users is specific contexts. For
instance, inserting private information into pop-ups (B4 in
Appendix VII-B) and clicking malicious links while reading
emails (VC2 in Appendix VII-B). These criteria, which are
indicative of ISA, cannot be evaluated directly from the raw
network traffic due to encryption. However, in some cases
we can infer that such behavior takes place using indirect
indicators. For instance, in order to directly infer that a user
clicks on malicious links while reading emails, it is necessary
to analyze the subject’s communication with email services
which are typically encrypted. Nonetheless, instances in which
communication with email services occurred around the same
time as communication with a malicious domain can be used
as an indicator that the subject tends to behave carelessly while
reading emails. The values of the criteria measured through
this method correspond to the number of appearances of the
relevant attributes.
C. Security Questionnaire
Security questionnaires are the most common method for
assessing ISA in the literature. The proposed security question-
naire was specifically designed to measure the self-reported
behavior of subjects with respect to the security awareness
criteria presented in [13]. When designing the survey, we fol-
lowed the methodologies and questions presented in previous
studies [11], [43], [20], [19], which pointed out two important
aspects of behavior with respect to information security:
preventive behavior i.e., actions that the user performs to
reduce the risk of being exposed to an attack; and confronting
behavior i.e., actions that the user performs when faced with
a security risk.
Similar to previous studies, we formulated three type of
questions:
1) Questions which focus on the likelihood of taking an
action in the context of specific ISA criteria.
2) Questions which focus on the frequency at which the
subject performs an action in the context of specific ISA
criteria.
3) Questions which focus on management of the devices
built-in connectivity.
The complete questionnaire, together with the distribution
of each answer are presented in Appendix VII-A. In order
to evaluate the questionnaire we conducted a pilot study, in
which 20 users were requested to answer the questionnaire as
well as participating in focus groups. The main insight from
this pilot-study was that illustrations and snapshots need to be
added in order to make the questions more clear (e.g., security
alerts, popups, permissions, encrypted websites and etc.)
In order to evaluate the criteria using the security question-
naire, we created an ordinal five-level scale for each question,
where the first level represents a very reckless behavior, and
the fifth level represents the most cautious behavior. This scale
was considered the raw value of a user for a criterion (because
some criteria are evaluated using multiple questions, the values
of these criteria were calculated by averaging the raw values
of the relevant questions). Then, we calculated the normalized
value of a user for a criterion by normalizing the raw values
of all users for the same criteria. The normalized value was
considered as the value of criteria for the specific user.
D. Computing the User’s ISA Score for an Attack Class
The process of computing the ISA score of a smartphone
user for an attack class include two inputs (see Figure 1):
(1) a security awareness model for the particular class of
attacks as defined by Bitton et al. [13]; and (2) the values
of criteria for a particular user as measured by the various
data sources. The three security awareness models (referred
to as application model, MITM model, and phishing model)
are presented in Appendix ??, Figure 3, where we present
the weight (y-axis) for each criteria (x-axis). In addition, for
each model we map the three data sources to the criteria they
measure. As can be seen, some of the data sources are able to
measure only a partial set of criteria. We attribute this to the
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Figure 3: The three attack models; the highlighted areas
indicate the criteria that were measured using each data source.
fact that measuring the criteria is not a trivial task, especially
when using a passive data source (such as the network traffic
monitor). For instance, in the application model we can see
that the network traffic data source can measure criteria that
describe 62% of the model, where the mobile agent data source
can measure criteria that describe 87% of the model. On the
other hand, in the phishing model the most important criteria
can be measured using all the three data sources. It is worth
mentioning that the questionnaire data source can measure
all of the criteria, however as previously mentioned, this data
source tends to be very subjective.
The ISA score of a user u for an attack class a, using data
source d is denoted by s(u, a, d) and calculated as follows:
s(u, a, d) =
∑
i∈Cd wi(a) · ci(u)∑
i∈Cd wi(a)
(1)
where Cd denotes the set of ISA criteria measured using the
data source d, wi(a) denotes the weight of criterion i in the
awareness model a and ci(u) represents the value of criterion
i as measured using data source d.
Given the ISA score, we can partition the users into groups
according to three security awareness levels denoted as low,
medium, and high as follows:
L(u, a, d) =

low, s(u, a, d) < µ− β · σ
medium, µ− β · σ ≤ s(u, a, d) ≤ µ+ β · σ
high, µ+ β · σ < s(u, a, d)
(2)
where µ and σ denote the mean and the standard deviation
of the ISA scores in the population and β is a hyperparameter
which can be used to adjust the sizes of the groups within the
partition.
V. EVALUATION
The proposed framework computes the ISA score of a
user for a given SE attack class. The main hypothesis of
this research is that this score will indicate the ability of the
user to mitigate SE attacks. In other words, we assume that
subjects with a high ISA score will be less likely to fail in
mitigating SE attacks, while subjects with a low ISA score
will be much more vulnerable to these attacks. In order to
evaluate the proposed framework, we conducted a long-term
experiment involving 162 students who use their smartphones
regularly. During the experiment, we monitored the network
traffic of the subjects, measured their behavior while operating
their smartphones, and asked them to answer the security
questionnaire. Towards the end of the experiment we exposed
the subjects to four SE attacks. Then, we used the framework
to calculate the ISA score of each subject, and evaluated the
correctness of the score by cross-checking the score with the
subject’s performance in the challenges. In this section, we
provide a detailed explanation of the evaluation process and
results.
A. Social Engineering Challenges
In the interest of providing a practical evaluation of the
proposed framework, we implemented security challenges that
resemble different SE attacks. The primary advantage of this
kind of evaluation is that it measures the ability of a subject to
handle a real-life attack scenario. The challenges are: phishing,
spam pop-ups, suspicious permission requests, and certificate
manipulation. The last three challenges were implemented as
part of the mobile agent, either by presenting a message or
by presenting a pop-up Web-page. Only the first challenge
(spear phishing) was initiated via an email. In order to validate
that a participant completed the first challenge via the mobile
phone, we checked on our phishing web page the user-agent
field (in the HTTP request), which indicates whether the client
is a mobile-client or pc-client. The users that complete the
challenge using their PC were filtered out in the analysis of
this challenge.
1) Spear phishing: One of the most common SE attacks
is phishing. The spear phishing challenge (presented in Fig-
ure 4a) is a Web page that mimics a login page for student
services.4 The attack scenario began by sending an email to
the subjects that includes a message in which the subjects were
asked to authenticate themselves using an attached link due to
a problem with the university’s computer systems. The sender
of the email was “STUDENT ADMINISTRATION,” a sender
that the subjects are familiar with as emails associated with the
university’s administration are sent by this entity. The email
was sent to the participants during the academic semester,
where administrative emails are more likely to be sent by
the university’s IT department. Although the email looked
like a legitimate email, there were several indicators that it
was a phishing scenario. First, the phishing email was not
4This challenge was executed with the permission of the university’s IT
department and implemented under the departments supervision.
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sent from the university’s mail system. Second, the attached
URL was not associated with the university’s domain. Third,
the phishing Web page was not connected via the HTTPS
protocol. To preserve the subjects’ privacy, the authentication
information was not transmitted to the server. Instead, we
implemented a client side script that validates the username
and ID number. Please refer to Section V-B3 for further
issues related to privacy and ethical considerations. Within
this challenge, a subject who click on the malicious URL,
and insert his/her private credentials in the phishing Web site
was considered as failed in mitigating the attack.
2) SPAM pop-ups: Spam can expose the subject to privacy
and security threats. The spam challenge (presented in Fig-
ure 4b) is a Web page which offers a chance to win an iPad
by answering a simple question; the subject is requested to
expose personal information (such as their first name, date
of birth, and email address). This attack scenario is executed
when the user is within the context of mobile browsing, with
a pop-up that was triggered by the mobile agent and appears
on the subject’s screen. Similar to the phishing challenge,
the personal information supplied by the subjects was not
transmitted to the server. Within this challenge, a subject who
insert his/her private information to the spam pop-up was
considered as failed in mitigating the attack.
3) Suspicious permission request: Malicious applications
can trick unaware users into granting dangerous permissions
during runtime. In this challenge (presented in Figure 4c), the
Web page contained a request to grant superuser privileges
for a ”browser plug-in.” The attack scenario was initiated
when the user is within the context of mobile browsing; this
triggered a ”system alert” which was initiated by the mobile
agent and appeared on the subject’s screen. The subject could
reject the request approve it forever, or approve it only for that
time. Within this challenge, a subject who grant the superuser
privileges to the browser plug-in was considered as failed in
mitigating the attack.
4) Certificate manipulation: In this challenge (presented in
Figure 4d), the Web page contained a security warning about
using a certificate that is signed by an untrusted certificate
authority. The attack scenario was initiated when the subject
opened a secure connection to a website by using the browser.
Then, triggered by the mobile agent, a ”system alert” was
issued and appeared on the subject’s screen. The subjects could
accept the certificate, request more information, or cancel and
navigate out of the suspicious website; the ”more information”
button provided information written in Chinese. Within this
challenge, a subject who accept the untrusted certificate was
considered as failed in mitigating the attack.
B. Data Collection
1) Recruitment: Collecting data from real subjects in their
natural environment and for a long-term period is very chal-
lenging. In order to recruit a diverse population of subjects,
we sent emails to active students and graduate students of
two different academic institutes in Israel. The title of the
email was ”Invitation to participate in a study on Android
smartphones.” Within the content of the email the potential
subjects were told that the purpose of the study is to explore
their browsing habits (we intentionally obfuscated the fact that
the study is about information security to avoid Hawthorne
effects, in which subjects modify their behavior in response to
their awareness of being observed)5.
About 1000 subjects were agreed to participate in the
study, we invited 300 of them to our laboratory in order to
sign in to the experiment, receive guidance, and install the
data collection framework. About 250 of subjected received
the guidance and 220 of them signed in to participate in
the research. Upon signing the consent form, subject were
requested to complete a demographic survey on Google Forms.
Each one of them received a compensation of 200 USD.
It should be mentioned that during the first week of the
experiment 40 participant opted to withdraw from the exper-
iment; this was due to a high battery consumption or incom-
patibility of the data collection framework (which resulted
in repeating crashes of the agent). In addition, we filtered
out 18 participants who did not activated the data collection
framework regularly. Finally, 162 participants who use their
smartphones regularly served as the subjects of the experiment
and for the data analysis and evaluation.
Descriptive statistics of the population are presented in
Figure 5. As can be seen, the population consisted mainly of 19
to 30 year-old’s, almost half of which are students/university-
graduated from the faculty of engineering. We also analyzed
the distribution in the number of distinct application instal-
lations among the experiment population. As can be seen in
Figure 6, most of the applications are installed on less than
20% of the devices and more than 40% of the applications
are installed on one device only. On the other hand, popular
applications such as Whatsapp, Chrome, Waze, Facebook,
Shazam, Skype, GetTaxi, and Instagram were installed on
more that 50% of the devices (see Figure ??). This indicates
that the population of participants in the experiment is diverse.
In order to validate that the users use their smartphone
regularly throughout the study. We routinely sent a ”keep-
alive” message to our data collection servers every 30 minutes.
If for a period of 6 hours such message was not received
the participant was automatically notified via an email. We
also routinely validated that the VPN connection is active.
In the case that a user was not connected to the VPN for a
period of six hours, he was automatically notified via an email.
Nevertheless, by the end of the experiment we requested each
participant to complete the missing days by extending the
experiment period respectively. At the end, each participant
was active for at least seven weeks.
2) Experiment setup: In the experiment, each subject was
requested to install two Android applications: a dedicated
Android application that was developed by the research group
5This form of deception was approved by the institutional Human Subjects
Research Committee.
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(a) The spear phishing challenge
Web page.
(b) The spam challenge offering
a chance to win an iPad.
(c) Request to grant super user
privilege for a browser plug-in.
(d) Certificate manipulation
challenge.
Figure 4: The social engineering challenges
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Figure 5: Demographic properties of the subjects.
and used to passively monitor the subjects’ behavior based on a
set of sensors (as described in Section IV-A); and a commercial
VPN client application that was used to redirect the subjects’
Internet traffic to the server used in the experiment. It should
be mentioned that all of the data was transmitted securely to
this server.
The experiment was conducted according to the following
schedule:
• Opening session: At the beginning of the experiment the
subjects were asked to install the applications on their
personal smartphones and keep them there for a period
of seven weeks.
• Passive data collection: During the first three weeks
of the experiment, we passively monitored the subjects’
behavior and Internet traffic using the mobile agent and
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Figure 6: Distribution of distinct installations.
VPN applications. During this period the subjects were
not exposed to any challenges.
• Active probing: From the fourth week on, each subject
was exposed to a different challenge each week. To
prevent the order of the challenges to influence the results,
the order was based on the lattice square design [58].
• Security questionnaire: At the end of the seventh week,
the subjects were requested to answer an online security
questionnaire.
3) Privacy and ethical considerations: The experiment
involved collecting sensitive personal information from real
subjects for a long period of time, including their browsing
patterns. We did our best to preserve the subjects’ privacy
and reduce any risks associated with participating in the
experiment. The experiment was approved by the institutional
review board (IRB), subject to the following precautions:
1) The subjects participated in the experiments, freely, at
their own free will, and provided their formal consent to
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Figure 7: Distinct installations of popular applications (after
filtering system applications).
participate in the research. The subjects received a one-
time payment as compensation for their participation.
Although, at the beginning of the experiment the subject
were not aware to its purpose, they were fully aware
of the type of data that would be collected and were
allowed to withdraw from the study at any time.
2) Anonymization was applied to the data. At the beginning
of the experiment, a random user ID was assigned to
each subject, and this user ID served as the identifier
of the subject, rather than his/her actual identifying
information. The mapping between the experiment’s
user ID and the identity of the subjects was stored in
a hard copy document that was kept in a safe box; at
the end of the experiment we destroyed this document.
3) During the experiment, the communication between the
agents and the servers was fully encrypted and the
collected data was stored in an encrypted database. At
the end of the experiment the data was transferred to
a local server (i.e., within the institutional network),
which is not connected to the Internet. Only anonymized
information of the subjects was kept for further analysis.
C. Statistical Analysis
The main hypothesis of this research is that subjects
with high ISA score are likely to mitigate SE attacks,
while subjects with low ISA score will fail doing so.
We evaluate this hypothesis with respect to the three
data sources (d ∈ {questionnaire, network, agent}) us-
ing the four challenges presented in Section V-A (a ∈
{phishing, spam, permissions, certificate}) In order to
evaluate the above hypothesis we start with the χ2-test to
check whether the failure (f(u, a)) of the subject u in chal-
lenge a and his/her awareness level (L(u, a, d)) are statistically
dependent. In a standard χ2-test the null hypothesis states that
the two variables are independent. If the null hypothesis is
accepted then the ISA score computed based on the specific
data source does not reflect the subject’s ability to mitigate
the challenge. If the alternative hypothesis is accepted, that
is, success in the SE challenges and the level of security
awareness are statistically dependent, then the latter can be
used to guide security awareness policies.
However, χ2-test does not provide the complete picture. For
example, if most people with high security awareness will fail
mitigating the SE attacks and most people with low security
awareness will succeed doing so, then both variables will be
statistically dependent but the computed ISA score will be
misleading. We will demonstrate such situation in Section V-D
based on the data collected during our experiment.
In order to complement the statistical analysis we use
Pearson correlation coefficient to check for trends and de-
rive actionable insights. We define the average ISA score
(s(l, a, d)) of the subjects with security awareness level l ∈
{low,medium, high} as:
s(l, a, d) = avgu:L(u,a,d)=l{s(u, a, d)}.
We define the success rate (sr(l, a, d)) of the subjects with
security awareness level l as the fraction of the subjects that
succeeded at mitigating the challenge out of all subjects with
security awareness level l:
sr(l, a, d) =
|{u : L(u, a, d) = l ∧ f(u, a) = success}|
|{u : L(u, a, d) = l}|
We examine the Pearson correlation coefficient between the
two random variables sr(l, a, d) and s(l, a, d) across different
security levels. A high positive correlation along with signif-
icant statistical dependency according to χ2-test will suggest
that the level of ISA computed based on the source d correctly
reflect the ability of the subjects to mitigate SE attacks similar
to a. Ideally, the following inequality should hold for any a
and d: sr(low, a, d) < sr(medium, a, d) < sr(high, a, d).
D. Results
The statistical analysis described above was applied on the
three data sources (questionnaire, network and agent). Success
rates of subjects are presented in Figure 8, where each sub-
figure present the performance of the three data sources for
a specific challenge. The p-values associated with the χ2
tests for each data source are presented in the figure legend.
The dashed lines indicate the overall success rate for each
challenge.
As can be seen, in most of the challenges, the classification
based on the mobile agent and network traffic analysis are
statistically significant. In addition, in all of the challenges, the
mobile agent and network traffic monitor classify the subjects
to awareness groups that are correlated to the success rates
for the challenge. This observation is also reflected in the
correlation coefficient matrix presented in Figure 9a, since the
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Figure 8: The success rate of each awareness group (low,
average, high) in each challenge; the dashed line represents
the overall success rate for the challenge.
average ISA scores based on the mobile agent and network
traffic analysis are linearly correlated with the success rates for
the challenges. On the other hand, the assessment of ISA based
on the security questionnaire produced a negative correlation;
namely, the questionnaire classified the subjects into awareness
groups that are not correlated to the success rates for the
challenge.
This insight prompted us to further investigate the corre-
lation between the ISA scores of different data sources. In
Figure 9b, we present the Pearson correlation coefficients for
each pair of data sources (y-axis) and awareness model (x-
axis). As can be seen, for the phishing and MITM models
the ISA scores generated by the network traffic monitor and
mobile agent are highly correlated. We attribute this to the
fact that both the phishing and MiTM models are based on
criteria that can be measured precisely from the network and
agent. However, for the application model the correlation of
the ISA scores generated by the network traffic and mobile
agent is slightly lower. We attribute this to the fact that some
of the criteria are not measurable through the network. On
the other hand, the ISA scores generated by the security
questionnaire are not correlated with the ISA scores derived
from the network traffic monitor or agent data sources.
The contradictions between the self-reported behavior of
Network Agent Questionnaire
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(b) The correlation between the awareness scores generated from
the different data sources for each awareness model
Figure 9: Results of the correlation tests.
the subjects (measured by the behavioral questionnaire) and
the actual behavior (measured by the mobile agent, network
traffic, and the challenges) can be seen more clearly in lower
resolution by analyzing subjects’ responses specific questions.
The distribution of questionnaire answers is presented in
Figure 10).
An interesting observation is that about 70% of the subjects
have reported that they would never provide personal data in
pop-up Web pages. However, as presented in Figure 11, when
analyzing the actual behaviour of these subjects we noticed
that almost 40% of them entered their private data in the SPAM
website (our SPAM challenge). Similarly, almost 60% out of
the subjects who reported that it is unlikely that they would
provide personal data in a pop-up Web pages did entered their
heir private data in the SPAM website (our SPAM challenge).
Similar findings were observed while investigating questions
related to certificates, lock screen protection, and file down-
loads. For example, 50% of the subjects who claimed that
would never enter a Website for which a security warning was
displayed, failed in the certificate manipulation challenge; 35%
of the subjects who claimed that they always use lock screen
protection (e.g., password, PIN code, or pattern) did not use
any method at all; and subjects who claimed that it is unlikely
that they would download a file via (unsecured/unencrypted)
HTTP protocol, downloaded on average executable files via
HTTP during the experiment. On the other hand, subjects
who reported that they always download files via HTTP,
downloaded on average six executable files via HTTP during
the experiment.
In general, from the analysis of the gap between the self-
reported behavior and the monitored behaviour (i.e., real
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Figure 10: Questionnaire answers’ distribution
measurements) we conclude that security aware subjects less
determined in their questionnaire’s answers, while subject
that were found to be with a low security awareness level
were more determined and reported a ”safer” behavior. These
conflicts supports the underlying assumption made in previous
studies that the self-reported behavior is not reliable for
measuring the behavior of subjects.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we develop a framework for assessing the ISA
of smartphone users. The framework utilize three different data
sources in order to evaluate an extensive list of criteria for a
security aware smartphone user. Although in previous sections
we showed that the mobile agent data source produced the best
results, there are additional criteria that should be considered
when selecting a data source in production. In this section we
elaborate on those criteria.
A. Interactivity
A very important aspect to consider when selecting a data
source in production is the level of interaction with subjects.
A high level of interactivity requires more resources, hence, it
is less likely to be performed on an ongoing basis. In terms of
this criterion, the questionnaire requires the most significant
amount of interaction with each subject. In contrast, measuring
the ISA via a mobile agent requires a significantly lower
level of interaction with the subjects as it requires a one-time
installation of the application on their devices. However, in this
category, the network traffic monitor data source outperforms
all other data sources, as it does not require any interaction
with the subjects.
B. Reliability
An unreliable data source will eventually produce an inac-
curate assessment. Hence, reliability is an extremely important
aspect to consider when selecting a data source. With regard
to this criterion, the completion of a questionnaire, which
is largely dependent on the subjects’ reliability, has inherent
disadvantages. As presented in the previous section, when
analyzing the security questionnaire we observed that subjects
behaved differently than their stated behavior, as reported
in the security questionnaire. The high performance of an
ISA assessment based on objective data sources compared
to performance of the security questionnaire data source,
indicates that in terms of reliability, objective measures such
as the network traffic monitor and mobile agent are superior.
C. Timeliness
Another important aspect to consider is the monitoring
period required for a reliable assessment of the subject’s
ISA. Although, this aspect is less relevant for a security
questionnaire, it is crucial for the other data sources, since
a data source that is based on behavioral monitoring is more
likely to be inaccurate without a sufficient amount of data.
With respect to this criterion, the mobile device agent is
superior to the network traffic monitor. The main reason for
this is that many types of security criteria can be measured
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Figure 11: Comparison of self-reported behaviour (questionnaire) to measurement data (agent, network-traffic and challenges).
by the mobile device agent immediately, at installation time,
by observing device parameters, whereas measuring the same
criteria solely by utilizing network traffic may take more time.
A good example of such criteria are those criteria that are
based on the list of installed applications (e.g., the presence
of an anti-virus application). Obtaining such information by
using the mobile device agent is as simple as calling an API
function, whereas assessing such information from the network
traffic depends upon the presence of communication between
the anti-virus application and its server.
D. Intrusiveness
Preserving subjects’ privacy is probably the most impor-
tant considerations when implementing such a framework in
production. Especially, given the worldwide adoption of the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [21]. With respect
to this criteria, it is very important to mention that the data
collection framework for conducting a user study (experimen-
tation and research) are not the same as for a production sys-
tem. Specifically, when conducting an exploratory experiment
more data is collected because it is impossible to know in
advance what are the exact parameters and data that are re-
quired for evaluating the security awareness. Therefore, in the
experimental framework we collected raw network traffic and
sensor data. This raw data was stored in an anonymized and
encrypted form in an isolated environment, and analyzed by
authorized users only. However, in a production environment
the collected information can be dramatically minimized: (a)
based on the research results and derived insights only the
relevant data (that is required for the specific purpose) can be
collected and analyzed; (b) analysis of most data can be done
on the device and therefore, there is no need to store/transmit
15
raw data out of the device (only aggregated data which does
not contain any sensitive information).
Nevertheless, with respect to intrusiveness, the security
questionnaire is the least intrusive data sources. This is
followed by the network traffic monitor and mobile device
agent which are more intrusive. However, in a production
system, where the analysis are done on the device and only
aggregated information is stored for a long period; the network
traffic monitor and mobile device agent are not more intrusive
than most of todays intrusion detection/prevention systems
(IDSs/IPSs), and mobile device management solutions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a novel framework for evaluating
the ISA of smartphone users. The assessment is based on
three data sources, each one of which requires a different
level of interaction with the subjects. Our results shows that
the mobile agent provides the most reliable information; the
traffic monitor requires the least interaction with the subjects;
and the security questionnaire is the least intrusive among the
three.
We also conducted a comprehensive user study involving
162 smartphone users. Within this study we used the proposed
framework to monitor the behaviour of users while using
their own smartphones. In addition, all subjects were exposed
to four simulated challenges that resemble real-life social
engineering attacks. using Our results indicate that an ISA
assessments, which are based on the mobile agent and on the
passive traffic monitoring correctly reflect the ability of the
subjects to mitigate SE attacks. In addition, multiple contra-
dictions were observed between the self-reported behavior of
subjects according to the security questionnaire and the actual
measured behavior. These inconsistencies stress the necessity
of acquiring objective measurements while assessing ISA of
smartphone users.
The practical significance of this study are three-fold. First,
the framework enable organizations to accurately and contin-
uously assess the ISA of their employees without interfering
with their everyday tasks. Second, the framework enable the
early identification of users that are vulnerable to a specific SE
attack class, and provide the organization with the exact factors
that make a user vulnerable to those attacks. Knowing those
factors enable an effective, targeted and efficient implementa-
tion of countermeasures, such as developing a focused security
awareness programs, customize cyber security protection tools
to the individual needs of employees, and etc. Third, because it
does not require any interaction with the users, the proposed
framework is also scalable and the assessment can be done
automatically.
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APPENDICES
A. The Security Questionnaire
What is the likelihood of you to perform the following actions? Never Unlikely MediumLikelihood Very Likely Always
1. Downloaded application from unofficial application store.     
2. Install application that requires permissions that are not necessary for its
functionality (figure attached).
    
3. Install applications with a low rating (figure attached).     
4. Install application that requires root privileges (figure attached).     
5. Approve an application update that requires permissions that are not neces-
sary for the applications functionality (figure attached).
    
6. Verify an application update before approving it.     
7. Enter an advertisement while using an application.     
8. Enter an advertisement of a lottery.     
9. Check which applications are installed on the device (figure attached).     
10. Check which applications are running (figure attached).     
11. Close applications that are running in the background (figure attached).     
12. Delete applications that are not in use.     
13. Enter a website despite a security warning that this site is dangerous (figure
attached).
    
14. Download file from a site that does not use an encryption protocol (figure
attached).
    
15. Insert private information in a site which does not use an encryption protocol
(figure attached).
    
16. Use your personal password in a site which does not use an encryption
protocol (figure attached).
    
17. Enter private information (e.g., phone number, email address) into a pop-up
that appears while using an application (figure attached).
    
18. Open an email classified as spam (figure attached).     
19. Enter a link sent from unknown party (e.g., via Facebook, WhatsApp, SMS).     
20. Download a file sent to you by email from an unknown sender.     
21. Use a simple password that contains known personal details (e.g., name,
date of birth, phone number).
    
22. Use a password that is constructed from many different digits and characters.     
23. Use the same password for different services.     
24. Save your password as plain-text on your device (e.g., in your contacts,
document, notes).
    
25. Update your password in case you suspect that someone knows it.     
26. Update your password at least once a year.     
27. Use two-factor authentication for email/Facebook (a service in which another
authentication is used besides the password - figure attached).
    
28. Use password management services (figure attached).     
29. Jailbreak/root your device.     
30. Use embedded security systems (e.g., firewall, encryption).     
31. Install anti-virus application.     
32. Ignore a security alert (figure attached).     
33. Use screen lock (e.g., PIN code, pattern, fingerprint).     
34. Use public (unencrypted) WiFi networks (figure attached).     
35. Download files while using a public network.     
36. Use a VPN services while using the internet.     
37. Use personal services (e.g., bank, online shopping, Facebook) while con-
nected to a public Wi-Fi network
    
38. Auto-connect to Bluetooth devices.     
39. Connect your smartphone to foreign device (e.g., a friends computer, wireless
headphones).
    
How often do you turn off the following
components in your device?
Always off, unless
needed
Turned on when
needed, but often
forget to turn off
Turned on if the
battery allows Always on
I didn’t know it
could be turned off
40. GPS     
41. Wi-Fi     
42. NFC     
43. Bluetooth     
How frequently do you update the following services/applications on
your smartphone?
I use
auto-update
When I receive
a notification Once a month
Once in six
months
Only when I
must
44. Operating system.     
45. System applications (e.g., Web browser, messaging applications).     
46. Security applications (e.g., anti-virus, firewall).     
47. Other applications on the device (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp)     
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B. The Complete List of Security Awareness Criteria and the Indicators for Measuring Them
ID Topics Description Network Indicators Mobile Agent Indicators QuestionnaireIndicators
Focus Area: Applications Sub-Focus Area: Application Installation (AI)
AI1 UntrustedSources
Download applications solely
from trusted sources
Monitor accesses untrusted
application sources, monitor
downloads of APK files.
Check the source of installed
applications. Q1
AI2 Permissions
Does not install applications
that require dangerous
permissions.
–
Monitor applications that
requires dangerous permissions
and their Google Play ranking
is less than 3.5 [1].
Q2
AI3 Rating Does not install applicationswith a low rating. –
Monitor installed applications
with low Google Play rating
(less than 3.5).
Q3
AI4 Root/Jailbreak Rarely installs applications thatrequire root privileges. –
Monitor applications that
require root privileges Q4
Focus Area: Applications Sub-Focus Area: Application Handling (AH)
AH1 ApplicationUpdates Regularly update applications –
Check how many of the
installed applications are not
up-to-date.
Q5, Q6
AH2 Advertisements Rarely clicks on advertisements
Monitor communication with
domains associated with
monitoring advertisements
clicks (e.g., ad.doubleclick.net).
Monitor communication with
domains associated with
monitoring advertisements
clicks (e.g., ad.doubleclick.net).
Q7, Q8
AH3 ApplicationManagement
Properly manages
running/installed applications –
Monitor deletion of
applications. Q9,Q10,Q11,Q12
Focus Area: Browsing and Communication Sub-Focus Area: Browser (B)
B1 MaliciousDomain
Does not enter malicious
domains
Monitor accesses malicious
domains.
Monitor accesses malicious
domains. Q13
B2 File Downloads Prefers to download files viaHTTPS.
Monitor downloads of files via
HTTP.
Monitor downloads of files via
HTTP. Q14
B3 DataConfidentiality
Does not send sensitive
information via HTTP.
Monitor personal information
sent as plaintext (using Regex). – Q15, Q16
B4 Pop-ups andAdvertisements
Does not insert private
information into popups.
Monitor transmission of private
information around the time at
which a pop-up was clicked.
– Q17
B5 Certificates
Operates in accordance with
system/browser alerts and does
not use untrusted certificates.
Monitor sessions that include
untrusted certificates that were
not terminated immediately
after the handshake.
Monitor accesses to domains
with untrusted certificates Q13
Focus Area: Browsing and Communication Sub-Focus Area: Virtual Communication (VC)
VC1 Spam
Does not open emails/messages
received from unknown senders
(or spam).
Monitor communication with
spam domains around the time
of communicating with email
services.
Monitor opens spam emails. Q18
VC2 MaliciousAttachments/URL
Does not download/execute
attachments, or click on URL’s
received from unknown senders.
Monitor communication with
malicious domains around the
time of communicating with
email services.
Monitor clicks on links sent via
SMS from unknown senders. Q19, Q20
Focus Area: Browsing and Communication Sub-Focus Area: Account (A)
A1 PasswordManagement
Updates passwords regularly,
use unguessable and diverse
passwords. Does not store
passwords unsafely
– – Q21, Q22, Q23,Q24, Q25, Q26
A2 Two FactorAuthentication
Uses two-factor authentication
mechanisms. –
Monitor SMS with
authentication codes (i.e.,
monitor messages associated
with two-factor authentication
mechanisms).
Q27
A3 KeychainServices
Uses password management
services.
Monitor accesses domains
associated with password
management services.
Check for the existence of
password management
applications.
Q28
Focus Area: Device Sub-Focus Area: Operating systems (OS)
OS1 Updates
Uses an updated OS and
configures auto-updates for
critical services
Monitor the device model and
OS version (from HTTP
user-agent string) and verify
that this version is the latest.
Verify that the OS version is
the latest. Q45
OS2 Root/Jailbreak Does not root or jailbreak thedevice. –
Check whether the device is
rooted. Q29
Focus Area: Device Sub-Focus Area: Security Systems (SS)
SS1 EmbeddedSecurity Systems
Uses embedded security
systems. – – Q30
SS2 Anti-virus Uses anti-virus applicationregularly to scan the device.
Monitor accesses domains
associated with anti-virus
services
Check for the existence of
anti-virus applications Q31
SS3 Security Updates Updates security systems.
Monitor accesses to domains
associated with anti-virus
services
Monitor that security
applications are up-to-date Q47
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SS4 Security Alerts
Operates in accordance with
security alerts (i.e., does not
ignore security alerts).
– – Q32
SS5 Lock Screen Uses PIN-code/pattern/fingerprint. –
Check whether a lock screen
PIN-code/pattern is defined. Q33
Focus Area: Communication Channels Sub-Focus Area: Networks (N)
N1
Wi-Fi -
Unencrypted
Networks
Does not connect to
unencrypted networks. –
Monitor connections to
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks. Q34
N2
Wi-Fi -
Unencrypted
Networks
Does not download files on
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks –
Monitor files downloaded while
connected to unencrypted Wi-Fi
networks.
Q35
N3 VPN Uses VPN services on publicnetworks. –
Monitor VPN client applications
installed to the device. Q36
N4
Wi-Fi -
Unencrypted
Networks
Does not transmit private data
via unencrypted channels. –
Monitor private data transmitted
while connected to unencrypted
Wi-Fi networks
Q37
Focus Area: Communication Channels Sub-Focus Area: Physical Channels (PC)
PC1 Connectivity
Enables Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC,
and GPS while they are in use
and only connects trusted
Bluetooth and NFC devices,
and trusted Wi-Fi networks.
–
Check whether the Bluetooth
and/or NFC are turned on while
no device is connected. Check
whether the GPS is always
turned on.
Q38, Q41, Q42,
Q43, Q44
PC2 USB/ChargingConnections
Does not use a USB to connect
the device to unknown devices. – - Q39
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